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Abstract
Introduction This paper applies the thought of Jacques Rancière to the concept of democracy
as it is traditionally understood in library studies literature. 
Methods The paper reviews a cross-section of instances of the link between democracy and
the public library in library studies literature. It offers a close textual analysis of Michael
Gorman's Our Enduring Values as typifying the link between the public library and
democracy. It critically applies the theoretical account of democracy developed by Jacques
Rancière to Gorman's account in Our Enduring Values. 
Analysis Making use of the theory of Rancière, the paper argues that the link between the
public library and democracy should instead be situated in the impropriety of the public
library: the assumption of equality libraries make, and the consequent open possibility for the
contestation of their function and values.  
Results The paper ﬁnds that the link between democracy and the public library is situated in
libraries' instrumental value to democracy; libraries are typically seen as holding an educative
function for democracy. 
Conclusion The paper concludes by arguing that focusing on the impropriety of public
libraries is especially important in the context of their current neo-liberal restructuring. An
instrumental link between democracy and the public library too easily falls prey to neo-liberal
rationalisation. A link which focuses on the improper character of public libraries encourages
a contestation over this restructuring.
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Introduction
This paper makes use of the thought of Jacques Rancière to argue that the public library should be understood
as necessarily democratic: not because, as is the dominant thought in library studies literature, the library is
instrumentally valuable to democracy, but rather because of the assumption of equality at the heart of the public
library. Further, the paper suggests that Rancière’s conception of democracy can help us make sense of the
speciﬁc changes currently occurring in the United Kingdom (UK) public library service, and give us an
indication of how to stake a claim in this transformation. First I give an overview of Rancière’s thought,
focusing on his notions of equality, politics and democracy. I then contrast the traditional conception of
democracy in library studies literature, as exempliﬁed by Michael Gorman (2000), with Rancière’s conception.
I argue that there are limits to the traditional conception of democracy and demonstrate the way in which
Rancière’s conception overcomes these limits. Finally, in light of the current neo-liberal restructuring of the UK
library service that Greene and McMenemy (2012) have highlighted, I suggest that Rancière’s thought is
valuable in helping us understand and respond to these changes.
Rancière’s impropriety
Jacque Rancière’s career has touched on a large number of theoretical disciplines, ranging from philosophy,
historiography, aesthetics, pedagogy, political theory and cultural analysis. His thought cannot be reduced to
any single discipline and it would be inaccurate to say that his thought has developed over time. Indeed, a more
productive place to start when conceptualising Rancière’s thought would be with his methodology. When
Rancière is called on to discuss his overall project he time and again stresses that, ﬁrst and foremost, he is
concerned not with constructing theories but rather with instigating polemical interventions. As he says, his
works are not
‘theories of’, they are ‘interventions on’. They are polemical interventions. This does not only
mean that they take a political stance. This means that they imply a polemical view of what ideas
are and do (2009: 116).
Consequently, Rancière argues that “[t]hinking for me is always a rethinking. It is an activity that displaces an
object away from the site of its original appearance or attending discourse” (2000: 120). For Rancière, “[a]s I
conceive of them, concepts are neither Platonic ideas nor mere empirical designations. They are tools with
which we can draw a new topography in order to account for what happens to us” (2009a: 288). There is thus a
methodological impropriety at play in Rancière’s work: he refuses the role of the master explicator, instead
attempting to intervene in what is understood as the proper, legitimate way of developing theoretical accounts
of our world.
It therefore follows that impropriety is central to Rancière’s understanding of the concepts of politics, equality
and democracy[1] which I will be drawing on in relation to library studies. For Rancière, these concepts are
intimately linked. Politics, Rancière argues, is that which disrupts the “order of the visible and the sayable”
(1999: 29): the aesthetic distribution through which we experience our world, making certain subjectivities
visible and others invisible, and, further, assigning speciﬁc capacities to these subjectivities; giving them a
proper, legitimate place in the social order. In this way being political is a form of “trespass” (Devenney 2011:
160): it involves going where one is not meant to go; acting in a way in which one is not meant to act. For
Rancière these political moments are conﬁrmations of the fundamental equality we share with all speaking
beings:
Equality is not a given that politics then presses into service, an essence embodied in the law or a
goal politics sets itself the task of attaining. It is a mere assumption that needs to be discerned
within the practices implementing it (1999: 33).
Equality thus undermines the aesthetic ordering of bodies that determines not only what is proper, but who can
be seen to be proper in the ﬁrst place. In this context democracy, for Rancière, is the disruption of any
entitlement to govern. Indeed, it is the paradoxical assertion that the only legitimate entitlement to govern is not
through birth, or through wealth, or through knowledge, but through the equal lack of capacity to govern;
through one's illegitimacy. As Rancière says,
Democracy initially stirred up political philosophy because it is not a set of institutions or one kind
of regime among others but a way for politics to be. Democracy is not the parliamentary system or
the legitimate State. It is not a state of the social either, the reign of individualism or the masses.
Democracy is, in general, politics' mode of subjectiﬁcation if, by politics, we mean something
other than the organization of bodies as a community and the management of places, powers and
functions. Democracy is more precisely the name of a singular disruption of this order of
distribution of bodies as a community that we proposed to conceptualize in the broader concept of
the police. It is the name of what comes and interrupts the smooth working of this order through a
singular mechanism of subjectiﬁcation (Ibid. 99).
Democracy is thus concerned with aesthetics; with the power of language to be deployed in improper ways,
signifying new ways in which we can relate to the world and understand our place as a part of it:
In order to enter into political exchange, it becomes necessary to invent the scene upon which
spoken words may be audible, in which objects may be visible, and individuals themselves may be
recognized. It is in this respect that we may speak of a poetics of politics (2000: 116).
As I have said, Rancière’s commitment to an improper methodology - to interventions rather than theories - has
led him to place a stark distance between, on the one hand, his understanding of politics, equality and
democracy, and on the other the conventional understanding of these terms. It is my contention that this is
precisely what makes applying his thought to the ﬁeld of library studies valuable: his notion of democracy, as
the contestation and disruption of a given social order, resonates with the notion of the public library in a way
which hasn’t been considered by library studies literature.
The public library and democracy
The link between the public library and democracy has been noted at various times from a variety of sources
since the second half of the nineteenth century. Typically libraries are presented both as a necessity for any
country that wishes to be an effective democracy and, to a lesser extent, as a doorway to the right of every
citizen to cultural and intellectual development. Thus as Francis Miksa demonstrates, the 1876 Special Report
(from which Melvil Dewey’s classiﬁcation system ﬁrst grew to prominence) presents libraries as a public good
because they are “aids in a common effort to bring mental and moral cultivation to the masses” (Miksa 1983:
56). Writing in 1934, Grace O. Kelley notes that
from the beginning, the avowed purpose of public libraries has been to offer all kinds of
knowledge embodied in books to all kinds of people. In this way, it was thought, libraries would
further the eager quest by masses of readers for the universal enlightenment which is called for in a
truly democratic country (1934: 3).
Douglas Raber notes that the United States (US) Public Library Inquiry of 1947 was commissioned in part to
highlight the basic contribution of public libraries to society. This contribution was understood as
the commitment to and promotion of the freedom of inquiry necessary to the creation and
maintenance of democratic society. There was a hope and a belief that this was the library’s most
fundamental source of legitimacy, that the library actually did this, and that American society was
still a democratic one in which people’s opinions were still relevant to the formation of public
policy. In this view, the library’s purpose was intimately connected to an informed citizenry that
was the source of power, wisdom, and rightness of American culture and politics (Raber 1994: 51).
More recently, Alex Byrne, when discussing the implications of democracy for library management, notes that
libraries are “instruments of democracy” (2004: 16) since “[c]hoice [...] to be meaningful must be informed”
(Ibid. 11). He highlights the claim made by the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions
(IFLA) in their 2002 ‘Glasgow Declaration’ that “[l]ibraries and information services contribute to the
development and maintenance of intellectual freedom and help to safeguard democratic values and universal
civil rights” (2002).
One can see that, because of their educative function, libraries are consistently understood as being
instrumentally valuable to democracy. Exemplifying this argument is the penultimate chapter of Michael
Gorman’s Our Enduring Values (2000), which directly links the educative function of libraries with democracy.
Despite some brief allusions to libraries being “living examples of democracy in action” (Ibid. 159) Gorman
presents a very speciﬁc conception of democracy, limiting it to little more than a shorthand for the values that
are central to the library and information studies profession. As I will argue, it may be that libraries engender
these values (and in many cases should engender these values) but by conﬂating these values with democracy,
Gorman limits how we can think the role and function of libraries in a time when their role and function is
being actively threatened.
For Gorman,
It is a sad irony that as American democracy has reached its theoretical ideal - the enfranchisement
of all adults, irrespective of gender and race - it is in danger because of an increasingly ill-
informed, easily manipulated, and apathetic electorate. A culture of sound bites, political
ignorance, and unreasoning dislike of government are vitiating the rights for which, at different
times, revolutionaries, women, and ethnic minorities fought. Libraries are part of the solution to
this modern ill. As an integral part of the educational process and as a repository of the records of
humankind, the library stands for the means to achieve a better democracy (Ibid. 160).
The signiﬁcance of this passage hangs on Gorman’s ﬁnal claim: that libraries stand for a means to achieve a
better democracy. It is clear that libraries supposedly achieve this end through education; through their position
as “[f]oes of [i]gnorance” (Ibid. 163). For Gorman, our modern indirect democracies require “a steady ﬂow of
information to citizens and for that citizenry to be knowledgeable about social and political issues” (Ibid. 159).
He goes on to make the claim starkly: “[d]emocracy beneﬁts from an informed citizenry; a misinformed
citizenry damages it” (Ibid. 166). On the face of it, and from the perspective of the dominant understanding of
democracy in library studies, these claims make sense. After all, if power is to be placed in the hands of the
people, having those people educated is a rational course of action. However, as I have demonstrated, this
notion of democracy is by no means uncontested. Thinking democracy alongside Rancière makes visible some
critical questions that one might pose to Gorman and others who position the library as instrumentally valuable
to democracy. For example, one might ask what Gorman means when he talks of a damaged democracy, or of a
better democracy. If democracy is simply rule by the people, as Gorman initially highlights (Ibid. 158), then the
education of the people shouldn’t have any bearing on the quality of democracy because democracy isn’t a
concept that can have differing levels of quality: democracy does not carry normative value. It is simply, as
Gorman initially determines, rule by the people. However, a normative dimension of democracy is presupposed
when Gorman talks of a better or a damaged democracy. To clarify, the normative dimension presupposed by
Gorman does not specify which beliefs are necessary for an “informed citizenry” (Ibid. 166): Gorman is
attentive to the dangers of censorship, noting that “[t]here is a reason why antidemocratic individuals and
groups seek to censor publications and to control what is or is not held by libraries” (Ibid. 161). Nonetheless,
Gorman’s commitment to the “democratic values and ideals” (Ibid. 160) of “intellectual freedom, the common
good, service to all, the transmission of the human record to future generations, free access to knowledge and
information, nondiscrimination, and so on” (Ibid.) themselves function to add a particular normative ideal to
the notion of democracy which cannot be sustained if it is understood as rule by the people. It is important to
note that I am not arguing that there is no relationship between these values and democracy, or that it is
necessarily wrong to think of the relationship between libraries and democracy as being instrumental. What is
wrong, I would argue, is to conﬂate these values with democracy itself, and thus to limit what one can do with
the concept of democracy in relation to libraries. As I will go on to demonstrate, the values that Gorman
speciﬁes are indeed intimately related to democracy, but not as Gorman understands them.
Let us compare this understanding of democracy with Rancière’s. Rancière too starts with an understanding of
democracy as rule by the people. However, crucial for Rancière is the contestation over who the people are in
this formulation. Initially this is Gorman’s concern too. He notes that, in Athens, the people referred not to
everyone but to “a small minority of property owning males” (Ibid. 158). Following from this, Gorman argues
that in our more developed modern societies we recognise that the people must refer to all members of society,
and thus we now maintain “the enfranchisement of all adults, irrespective of gender and race” (Ibid. 160).
However, Gorman’s analysis misses what Rancière’s does not. Gorman understands the Ancient Greeks as
limiting the deﬁnition of the people to “a group set apart” (Ibid. 158), but this isn’t quite right. In his
Disagreement (1999: 21) Rancière notes that in both Plato and Aristotle’s account of politics a distinction is
made between those who are capable of speech - which articulates “what is useful and what is harmful, [...]
what is just and what is unjust” (Aristotle 1992: 60) - and mere voice which expresses “pain and pleasure”
(Ibid.). Thus, the exclusion in Greek society is a question not of one group being prioritised over another, but of
the visibility of certain groups as groups; of whether they can be seen or heard as political animals. It follows
that for Rancière there is always a contestation over who counts as a political animal, which no extension of
enfranchisement can do away with. As he says:
“the people” is the name, the form of subjectiﬁcation, of this immemorial and perennial wrong
through which the social order is symbolized by dooming the majority of speaking beings to the
night of silence or to the animal noise of voices expressing pleasure or pain (1999: 22).
Rather than doing away with this notion of the people because it is always incapable of fully describing any
social order, Rancière instead places this paradox at the centre of his understanding of democracy. In this
context democracy becomes the process by which those who suffer a primary exclusion make themselves of
some account. The subject of democracy for Rancière thus becomes the “part of those who have no part” (Ibid.
11), those who are excluded from a given social order through a lack of discursive visibility:
The political dispute is distinct from all conﬂicts of interest between constituted parts of the
population, for it is a conﬂict over the very count of those parties. It is not a discussion between
partners but an interlocution that undermines the very situation of interlocution. Democracy thus
sets up communities of a speciﬁc kind, polemical communities that undermine the very opposition
of the two logics - the police logic of the distribution of places and the political logic of the
egalitarian act (Ibid. 100).
On this reading it makes little sense to talk of libraries making democracy “better” (Gorman 2000: 160).
Nonetheless I contend that Rancière’s understanding of democracy is not only still relevant to libraries, but is
valuable in that it helps highlight the impropriety that is central to the idea of the library. This impropriety, I
would tentatively suggest, should be taken seriously if libraries are to be defended in light of their ongoing
transformation.
The impropriety of the public library
What does it mean to talk of the impropriety of libraries? It is clear that one cannot simply say that libraries are
improper spaces: libraries have a speciﬁc purpose - the provision of information - which consequently implies a
proper way for library patrons to exist within them. However, alongside this speciﬁc function is also a radical
lack of function: the library opens up vast possibilities for the patron and yet refuses to demand a purpose of
their visit. The “democratic values” (Ibid. 160) that libraries are committed to generate a tension between the
formal purpose of the library and the fundamental equality that these values recognise. In this way it is not that
the values Gorman lists are themselves democratic, but rather by being explicitly stated the veriﬁcation of these
values becomes a possibility for the library patron. It is through this process of veriﬁcation that these values
receive their meaning: they are “forces engendered and augmented by their own actualization” (Rancière 2008:
50). By being places open to everyone which also do not demand a purpose of a patron’s visit, libraries leave
open the possibility that their commitment to freedom of information, equity of access, neutrality etc. can be
continuously challenged. It is this open possibility of the contestation of the library, its function and its values
that places democracy at its heart. As Rancière says,
Genuine participation is the invention of that unpredictable subject which momentarily occupies
the street, the invention of a movement born of nothing but democracy itself. The guarantee of
permanent democracy is not the ﬁlling up of all the dead times and empty spaces by the forms of
participation and counterpower; it is the continual renewal of the actors and of the forms of their
actions, the ever-open possibility of the fresh emergence of this ﬂeeting subject. The test of
democracy must ever be in democracy's own image: versatile, sporadic - and founded on trust
(2007: 61).
The library is a fertile space for the emergence of this “unpredictable”, “ﬂeeting” subject. Indeed, the picture of
democracy that Rancière paints - “versatile, sporadic - and founded on trust” - offers a succinct articulation of
what makes the library an ideal site of political contestation. A library can be used in a myriad of ways: as a
place of research, a place of study, a place of conversation, a place of recreation, a place of shelter, a place of
safety, and countless other possibilities which are dependent on the imagination and actions of the patrons and
staff of the library, and on the trust that is assumed between the library and its patrons. The contestation and
actualisation of the values at the heart of libraries may not occur everywhere and at all times, but the
assumption of equality made by the library leaves open the possibility of this actualisation rather than closing it
down. It is this aspect of the library that should be highlighted when one constructs a link between libraries and
democracy: not the education that can be offered to the people, nor the democratic values that the library
symbolises, but rather the people’s veriﬁcation of these democratic values.
This politics of the library becomes especially relevant because of the time in which we currently ﬁnd
ourselves. The idea of the public library has gone through many transformations, however it is arguable that its
current transformation carries with it some stark implications. In a speech at the Re-modelling Library Services
Conference on 1st July 2010, Ed Vaizey, UK Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries,
made it clear that the re-modelling of libraries was “at the heart of the Big Society” (2010). Outlining what the
Big Society means, Vaizey quoted a speech from Prime Minister David Cameron in which Cameron claims that
the Big Society is
a society where the leading force for progress is social responsibility, not state control. It includes a
whole set of unifying approaches - breaking state monopolies, allowing charities, social enterprises
and companies to provide public services, devolving power down to neighbourhoods, making
government more accountable (2010).
It must be recognised, however, that not only is this approach concerned with “breaking state monopolies”, but
it is also concerned with placing libraries into the hands of private and - in the case of “social enterprises and
companies” - proﬁt making interests. The Chartered Institute of Library and Information Professionals (CILIP)
has noted that current proposals would result in “the closure of up to 20% of library service points” and “[a]
probable 4-6000 (full-time equivalent) reduction in the number of staff employed by public libraries” (2011: 2),
an estimated 700 of which have already occurred (Page 2012).
This re-modelling is the latest example of what has become known as neo-liberalism: a political, economic and
discursive phenomenon which can be understood as being typiﬁed by “deregulation, privatization, and the
dismantling of the social contract between capital and labor” (Castell 2000: 19). As Greene and McMenemy
note, neo-liberalism is characterised by “individualism, privatisation and decentralisation” (2012: 15); they
demonstrate that since “New Labour’s election in 1997 public service restructuring in the United Kingdom
continued the neo-liberal approach, with the linked considerations of managerialism and consumerism
impacting on the delivery of public services” (Ibid. 14). Greene and McMenemy’s paper is signiﬁcant as it
recognises the discursive functioning of neo-liberalism: its impact on the language of librarianship and thus its
power to limit the imagination of what the public library is, who it is for and how it functions. Greene and
McMenemy contend that far from being “neutral” (Ibid. 34) language “is used by neo-liberalists to introduce
reform and more radical public service restructuring” (Ibid.) which could “lead to the destruction of public
space as a democratic arena” (Ibid. 35). They go on:
The naturalisation of the language of the market such as calling patrons ‘customers’ has become so
entrenched in the mindset that it is now part of everyday language. The monetary and transactional
connotations associated with a term like ‘customer’ to describe a public sector user would have
appeared inappropriate to many thirty years ago, but due to the steady naturalisation of neo-liberal
discourse such terms appear innocuous (Ibid.).
As Greene and McMenemy note, what has occurred is a shift in the appropriateness of language. In previous
years it wouldn’t have made sense to talk of library patrons as customers, precisely because they were not
customers and were not treated as customers. Now, however, this phrasing has achieved a legitimacy which
makes it appropriate to treat library patrons as if they were customers, and so through this action to actualise
them as customers. This is a precise example of the operation of what Rancière describes as the police:
The police is thus ﬁrst an order of bodies that deﬁnes the allocation of ways of doing, ways of
being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place
and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and
another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another is noise (1999: 29).
Greene and McMenemy’s focus on the discursive power of neo-liberalism begins the process of how a
challenge to this restructuring might be mounted. To continue this process I would argue that the link between
the public library and democracy should be at the centre of this challenge. However, this should not be by
focusing on the instrumental value of libraries to democracy as Gorman contends, which would simply further
the “[r]ationalisation” (Greene and McMenemy 2012: 19) of the public library that neo-liberalism demands.
Indeed, it is precisely the library’s undoing of the instrumental rationality of neo-liberalism that makes it a
fertile site of democratic contestation. Instead, what is necessary is a response which recognises the “poetics of
politics” (Rancière 2000: 116) central to democratic activity; a response which refuses the subjectivity enforced
by the “policing” (Rancière 1999: 29) of neo-liberalism. Just as neo-liberalism polices the public library
through its discursive control over “the order of the visible and the sayable” (Ibid. 29), the response to this
policing must also attempt to reconﬁgure that order. It is this, for Rancière, that makes such political activity a
question of poetics: “[t]o afﬁrm the nature of the ‘poetic’ in politics means to assert ﬁrst and foremost that
politics is an activity of reconﬁguration of that which is given in the sensible” (2000: 115). On the one hand this
poetics of politics may be realised by the librarian: for example through the development of an open access
institutional repository; or the tender of open source library management software; or the democratisation of
stock purchasing; or the extension of library opening hours. On the other hand this poetics of politics may be
realised by the library patron: for example through the systematic borrowing of an entire library's stock
(Kennedy 2011); or an occupation of library premises (Flood 2013); or through the development of a “People’s
Library” (Lingel 2012). Further, this moment of “dissensus” (Rancière, 2010a) - the moment at which the
librarian or library patron starts acting in a way which is illegitimate for them to do so - returns us to what is
presupposed in libraries to begin with: equality. For Rancière,
[e]quality is enacted within the social machine through dissensus. And dissensus is not primarily a
quarrel, but is a gap in the very conﬁguration of sensible concepts, a dissociation introduced into
the correspondence between ways of being and ways of doing, seeing and speaking […] Equality
is fundamental and absent, timely and untimely, always up to the initiative of individuals and
groups who, set against the ordinary course of events, take the risk of verifying their equality, of
inventing individual and collective forms of its veriﬁcation (2010b: 15).
The equality of the library is actualised through the everyday actions of those who inhabit its space. The
challenge to this equality is real: it is systematic, ideologically driven and has already resulted in the material
destruction of libraries and the staffed positions within them. But it is out of this very challenge that the
“democratic values” (Gorman 2000: 160) central to libraries receive their value. The question is then whether
we will “take the risk of verifying [our] equality” (Rancière 2010b: 15); whether we allow poetics a part to play
in our democratic contestation of the public library.
[1] Developed across a range of writings since the late 1980s, most signiﬁcantly in On the Shores of Politics (2007), ‘Ten Theses on
Politics’ (2010) and Disagreement (1999).
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